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MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS:
FROM MONTREAL TO KYOTO - A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO AN
IMPROVED CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME

Sean Cumberlege*
"[T]here is no durable treaty which is not founded on reciprocaladvantage,
and indeed a treaty which does not satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is
apt to contain the seeds of its own dissolution. Thus the great secret of negotiation
is to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any proposal,
and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally balanced to both
parties." Frangois de Calli~res, De la Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains
(1716).
I. INTRODUCTION

Stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change are the two most significant
environmental challenges facing the world today. There is no longer any doubt that
an ambitious global plan must be crafted to address and reverse catastrophic
environmental harm. However, the level of government cooperation that is needed
and the fundamental change that is required in human economic and social
behavior makes climate change and ozone depletion difficult to reverse.' The
causes of climate change and its adverse impacts are closely linked to
industrialization, economic development, poverty alleviation and energy security necessitating an approach to climate mitigation that is sensitive to these concerns.
Moreover, both climate change and ozone depletion cannot be reversed without a
global effort involving all countries, and hence mandate that multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) form the basis of any potential solution.2
* University of Denver Sturm College of Law, JD expected 2009, Managing Editor of the
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. This paper was the winning submission in the Leonard
V. B. Sutton international law writing competition. As part of the award, the author was presented with
a scholarship to attend the Hague Academy of International Law in the Netherlands during the summer
of 2008. 1 would like to thank the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, not only for its
diligent work on this note, but also for providing me with some of my most precious law school
experiences. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Ved Nanda for all his support and guidance.
Most importantly, to my parents - Charmain and Peter - let me simply say that no son could ever ask
for more; your sacrifice and unwavering support has made my dreams a reality. I dedicate this note to
both of you.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal v. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols,31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
1,2 (2007).
2. See id.
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While climate change and ozone depletion are manifestations of different
harmful processes, they share four fundamental similarities: (1) both present
serious issues of international equity in that developed countries are the primary
contributors to both environmental problems and, hence, need to assume
predominant roles in mitigation efforts; (2) both problems involve extremely
serious difficulties due to intergenerational equity, as future generations are likely
to face greater environmental risks than current generations; (3) both
environmental concerns involve the tragedy of commons problem, in that states are
encouraged to simply "free ride" on the efforts of other states by benefiting from
the significant costs borne by parties that comply with their obligations; and (4)
both problems need the active participation of the United States (U.S.) for any
solution to be lasting and effective. 3
Despite these similarities, the two MEAs that currently address ozone
depletion and climate change, respectively, have enjoyed very different levels of
success. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Montreal Protocol) has been ratified by 193 countries around the world.4 In
addition, the parties to the Montreal Protocol are complying with their obligations,
and as a result, ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) have been drastically reduced,
and monitoring of the ozone layer indicates that the ozone is recovering.5 Due to
the enormously successful efforts of the parties to the Montreal Protocol, the treaty
is frequently hailed as the most successful environmental treaty ever devised.6
The global effort to mitigate climate change, however, presents an altogether
different story. Despite the fact that the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on
Climate Change entered into force in 2005 and has been ratified by 174 countries 7,
it has been largely ineffective in mitigating climate change.8 Indeed, despite high
participation (with the notable exception of the United States), it is widely known
that many parties to the Kyoto Protocol may not be complying with their
obligations. 9 The marginal results achieved under the Kyoto Protocol have led to

3. See id. at 3; see also Laura Thomas, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on
Ozone and Climate Change with Implicationsfor Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795,
797-99 (2003).
4. Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Status of Ratification
(2008), http://ozone.unep.org/Ratification-status/.
5. The Scientific Assessment Panel of the Motreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Executive Summary of the Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2006
(WMO/UNEP), 1-3 (Aug. 18, 2006), http://ozone.unep.org/AssessmentPanels/SAP/index.shtml
(suggesting that there is clear evidence of a decrease in the atmospheric burden of ozone-depleting
substances in the lower atmosphere and in the stratosphere, and that early signs of recovery are also
evident).
6. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING

THE

PLANET 1 (2nd ed. 1998); see also Thomas, supra note 3, at 797.
7. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/background
/status-of ratification/application/pdf/kp ratification.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
8. Laurie Goering, UN: Time is now to fix warming Ahead of bid to replace Kyoto pact, urgent
action urged, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2007.
9. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 21; see also Congressional Research Service, Greenhouse
Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations, at 12,
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significant academic criticism of the climate change regime and has increased
public demand for more effective international cooperation to reverse the
significant environmental degradation that has been allowed to continue
unchecked.10
This paper, therefore, attempts to develop a dynamic theory of multilateral
environmental treaty creation that builds on legal, economic and international
relations theory. Based on the theoretical framework developed, this paper also
seeks to outline why the Montreal Protocol has been extremely effective in
curtailing the production of ODSs, and why the Kyoto Protocol has been
ineffective in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper will also
recommend possible improvements and changes to the Kyoto Protocol to
transform it into a viable vehicle for lasting climate change alleviation. In doing so,
this paper makes the assumption that states act predominantly out of self-interest.
Thus, within the cooperation continuum, my analysis will be based somewhat on
political economic theory within the Realist school of thought.
Section II will propose a theoretical framework for lasting and effective
multilateral environmental agreements. In doing so, this paper goes beyond mere
formal treaty provisions by discussing, from a political economic perspective,
extra-legal strategies to encourage participation and compliance. It incorporates
basic game theory to illustrate the complexity of multilateral treaty creation.
Against this backdrop, section III will examine the Montreal Protocol and highlight
some of its unique mechanisms and approaches that make it an effective MEA.
Section IV will examine the Kyoto Protocol by describing the negotiations leading
up to its creation and highlighting the approaches and mechanisms that undermine
its effectiveness and efficacy. Section V will conclude with recommended changes
to the existing climate change regime, based not only on its obvious weaknesses,
but also on some of the theories and approaches developed in this paper.
II.

MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES:

A THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK

A. The Complex Nature ofEnvironmental Protection
International environmental concerns, along with any resulting call for global
action, raise a unique problem within the field of international relations.
Specifically, each country does not want to pay to protect the environment, but
each country also recognizes that if every other country takes this stance, the
environmental implications would be catastrophic. To make matters worse, even if
nations feel obliged to act, unilateral action will not work where the solution to an
international environmental risk is dependent on what other countries do to
advance the problem, and what other countries will do to solve the same problem. 1'
In other words, actions and choices of any given state frequently affect the welfare
of other states, whether positively or negatively. In this way, most environmental

RL32721
(2008)
(prepared by
Larry
Parker
& John
Blodgett),
available at
https://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Feb/RL32721 .pdf.
10. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4; Thomas, supra note 3, at 797.
11. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TREATY-MAKING 50-52 (2003).
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problems involve multilateral externalities, namely environmental effects felt from
activity outside a country's border, and actions that need to be taken outside a
given country's realm of direct control. 12 While many externalities are bilateral,
and hence easier to overcome, in the case of climate change and ozone depletion,
the multilateral externalities are reciprocal in a sense that (to varying degrees) each13
country imposes externalities on the other countries sharing the same resource.
Despite varying levels of emissions, every country emits ozone depleting
substances and GHGs, and, more importantly, every country is susceptible to
harmful effects caused by these emissions. But, to the extent that externalities exist
in ozone and climate change concerns, they can be characterized as asymmetric
because they affect nations differently. 14 Also, it is in the nature of global
environmental problems that the damage each country suffers is never proportional
to its share of global emissions.
Ultimately, solutions to transnational environmental problems are difficult to
create because they invariably involve (and mostly conflict with) the principle of
sovereignty. 1 Thus, the absence of a world government forces states to create a
system of rules and a system of incentives to change state behavior. Indeed, states
are forced to negotiate and cooperate to simultaneously minimize joint costs and
collectively maximize joint benefits. Reality, however, presents a difficult working
environment within which to come to lasting agreement. Specifically, transaction
costs are unequal, information is imperfect, bargaining power remains
asymmetrical and states remain wary of "opportunism through actual or threatened
intentional noncompliance."' 16 Despite these impediments to cooperation, states
nevertheless frequently recognize that cooperation is the only available option. The
key consideration, then, necessarily becomes the means with which to achieve
such cooperation. Ideally, participation in an environmental treaty must be
voluntary, targets must be accepted by consensus, and obligation must be
implemented and enforced by the parties to the treaty.' 7 History has shown,
however, that this is not easy to achieve.

12. Id. at 52.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing as examples: island states, coastal states, and those countries near the poles because
all
have more to lose than many other states).
15. See id. at xiii-xiv (assuming that states act primarily out of self-interest and, hence, approach
solutions to transnational problems with the view that any action needs to maximize this self interest);
VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE

2 1sT

CENTURY 17-

18 (2003); Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global
Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 473, 484 (2002) (highlighting that
developing countries were reticent to assume even voluntary commitments at the negotiations leading
up to the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change out of fear that such
commitments would infringe with their sovereign right to economic development).
16. Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory ofInternational Law, 51 BUFF. L. REv.

679, 692 (2003).
17. Christoph Bohringer & Michael Finus, The Kyoto Protocol:Success of Failure?,in CLIMATECHANGE POLICY 258 (Dieter Helm ed., 2005).
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B. RestructuringIncentives to EncourageParticipationand Compliance
The object of any MEA is ultimately to change state behavior to mitigate
harmful environmental degradation. In doing so, however, MEAs cannot rely
exclusively on moral necessity to encourage cooperation. Instead, MEAs that seek
to fundamentally alter state behavior and encourage widespread participation have
to restructure incentives to overcome constraints imposed by sovereignty.1 8 Treaty
design becomes a key consideration, and ultimately plays a determining factor in
the lasting efficacy of any agreement. Despite similarities between various
environmental concerns, no two treaties can be alike. Indeed, an examination of
existing international legal institutions suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach is
doomed to fail. 19 The larger question therefore becomes: under what
circumstances, or under what treaty design, can lasting environmental mitigation
be encouraged? Scott Barrett, a prominent scholar within the Rationalist school of
thought, articulates three broad requirements:
First, a treaty must be individually rational.This means that no party to
the treaty can gain by withdrawing, given the choices made by every
other country, and that no non-party (if any) can gain by acceding .... It
also means that no party can gain by failing to comply, given the
treaty's design. And it means that no non-party (again, if any) can gain
by changing its behavior (by polluting more or less, say), given every
other country's behavior.... Second, a treaty must be collectively
rational. This assumption recognizes negotiation to be a collective
activity, and requires that it not be possible for parties to gain
collectively by changing their treaty.... Finally, a self-enforcing treaty
must be "fair.'" Put differently, it must be perceived by the parties as
20
being legitimate.
It is because of these three broad requirements that no two MEAs can be
alike, because each multilateral agreement needs to be both rational to individual
countries and to the collective group. For each environmental concern, an
agreement will therefore have to create a different incentive structure to ensure
both participation and compliance, and to minimize the problems associated with
the "tragedy of commons," or "free-riding. 2 1 Closely associated is the necessity of
creating favorable cost-benefit structures for each prospective party to a MEA.
Indeed, the treaties that effectively deter non-participation and non-compliance
22
enjoy the most success.
The process of creating, or at least restructuring, incentives, however, is not
easy. One variable is the nature of the good or the behavior that is being regulated
and the means by which the regulation is put into place. Regulating a public good
18. Barrett, supra note 11, at 18.
19. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 689.
20. Barrett, supra note 11, at xiii-xiv.
21. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 693-95.
22. An example is the North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty where both participation and compliance was
encouraged by creating a treaty that maximized joint payoffs and, hence, created incentive. For an indepth discussion on the success of this treaty see Barrett, supra note 11, at 19-39.
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such as pollution creates difficulty in that there is an increased incentive for states
to "free-ride" on the collective efforts of other states. 23 Thus, a high degree of
participation becomes key. Once a treaty enjoys adequate participation, the
necessity of effective enforcement measures becomes self-evident: noncompliance with a treaty undermines its ultimate purpose. Hence, where states

agree that collective action is required, any resulting MEA has to create a system
of incentives that would dissuade a state from non-compliance. George Downs
maintains that "the level of threatened punishment needed to dissuade a State from
violating an agreement depends on the benefits that the State would gain from
defection." 24 Specifically, he maintains:
The larger the amount [of benefits from defection], the greater the
incentive to defect and the greater the threatened punishment that is
necessary to deter it. For example, to prevent a State from violating an
environmental agreement where the violation would save the State
twenty million dollars in pollution abatement costs requires more
aggressive enforcement and a larger penalty than is necessary to prevent
a violation that would save it only two million dollars.25

C. Using Game Theoty as a Model to UnderstandRational Choice
This section introduces a game theoretical approach to international
environmental treaty creation. Scholars frequently use game theory as a theoretical
model through which to examine and predict individual and group behavior.
Specifically, game theory attempts to analyze behavior in situations where the
utility of a state's available choices depends on the choices of other states, or at
least the perceived choices of other states.26 Game theory therefore provides a
useful framework for analysis of international treaty building and the primary
concerns that impede lasting and effective cooperation.27 In this context, game
theory assumes that states are unitary rational actors that seek to maximize their
28
"individual" welfare by making decisions based on an expected payoff structure
associated with each choice it could make. 29 A central tenet of game theory is that
the choice of one state can affect the welfare of the other state.30

23. Barrett, supra note 11, at 83, 219.
24. George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 319,
324 (1998).
25. Id.
26. For a more thorough explanation of Prisoner's Dilemma see EconPort, Beginner's Guide,
http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=man-gametheory-exp.prisondil (last visited Nov. 26,
2008).
27. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 16, at 700.
28. Id. at 704 (maintaining that "payoffs associated with cooperation are generally diffuse,
widespread, long-term, and arguably more closely linked to perceptions of national welfare, while the
payoffs associated with defection are generally concentrated among particular industry groups, shortterm, and more closely linked to the welfare of politicians and special interests.").
29. For a successful application of game theory to the environmental treaty regime, states are
presumed to be the dominant actors in international relations.
30. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 706.
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In its most basic form, game theory is illustrated in a simple two-player game
called Prisoner's Dilemma. 3 1 In the context of environmental treaty negotiation, we
can assume, therefore, that two states are presented with a situation where they
have the choice to abate (stop polluting) or to continue polluting. In essence, state
A and B each face a decision regarding whether to cooperate with each other,
without being certain as to what the other state will choose. To make matters less
certain, different outcomes lead to different payoff structures, illustrated in the
following example by simple monetary figures to represent overall economic
benefits associated with each choice. For example, in the classic Prisoner's
Dilemma, if both states choose to cooperate and abate, they will both enjoy a net
payoff of $5, for a total of $10. If, however, both players choose to continue
polluting, they each receive a payoff of only $3, for a total of $6. Last, if one state
chooses to cooperate by abating and the other state chooses to pollute, the
cooperating state receives a payoff of $2, while the polluter receives a payoff of
$7, for a total of $9. Thus, one can see that the best possible outcome is that both
states abate and receive a combined payoff of $10. However, when making their
choice, each state recognizes that if they cooperate and the other state defects, their
net payoffs will be less than it would be had they chosen to defect (compare a
payoff of $2 with a payoff of $3). In this way, uncertainty and the nature of the
problem force states to accept that polluting is their dominant strategy because the
individual payoffs are higher, whether the other state chooses to cooperate or
abate.
Based on the situation in a Prisoner's Dilemma, it therefore becomes
necessary for the parties to give each other mutual assurances before "the game,"
and for states to create a situation where the dominant strategy is to abate. In
reality, states are forced to try and manipulate the nature of the game by tying their
hands and committing to cooperate by creating mechanisms and institutions to
encourage, monitor and enforce participation and compliance.32 In this way, the
institution or regime can reward cooperators or punish defectors, and hence,

31. The classical Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is as follows:
Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a
conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal: if one
testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the
silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both stay silent, both prisoners are sentenced to
only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence.
Each prisoner must make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. However, neither
prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. So this dilemma poses the question:
How should the prisoners act? Keep in mind that the best option for both is to keep silent; however,
remaining silent puts the silent prisoner at risk of a ten-year sentence if the other prisoner decides to
cooperate. In this way, each would likely decide to betray each other because, at worst, they will only
receive a five-year sentence, compared to the worst case scenario of receiving a ten-year sentence for
remaining silent. Thus, the Prisoners Dilemma is used by scholars to rationalize the choices states make
in deciding whether to abate or continue polluting in light of the payoffs of each option. In the classic
Prisoners' Dilemma story, the payoffs refer to the expected length of jail sentences depending on each
outcome. Payoffs, in the context of this note, refer simply to the measure of utility of each choice faced
by countries engaged in treaty negotiation.
32. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 719.
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directly influence the payoff structure of present and future iterations (games).33
This, in turn, leads to different choices and outcomes. Take for example, the
radically different outcome in the counterpart to Prisoner's Dilemma, a game aptly
referred to as Harmony.
In Harmony, if both states choose to cooperate and abate, they both enjoy a
net payoff of $6, for a total of $12. If, however, both players choose to continue
polluting, they each receive a payoff of only $2, for a total of $4. Last, if one state
chooses to cooperate by abating and the other state chooses to pollute, the
cooperating state receives a payoff of $4, while the polluter receives a payoff of
$3, for a total of $7. Like Prisoner's Dilemma, the best possible outcome is created
when both states abate and receive a combined payoff of $12. However, when
making their choice, each state recognizes that the individual payoff associated
with abatement is higher regardless of what the other state does. In this way,
abatement becomes each state's dominant strategy.
While these games may be too simple to completely capture the complexities
inherent in treaty negotiation and creation, they nonetheless provide insightful
illustrations of the basic choices and outcomes that are important variables in the
MEA negotiation process. In addition, the illustrations above suggest that in order
to encourage participation and compliance, states can jointly restructure payoffs
and incentives by either punishing non-cooperation, or creating positive payoffs
for cooperation.
Frischmann identifies three stages of the game, as it relates to MEAs. The
first stage involves framing the game whereby states recognize an interdependent
problem and propose potential solutions.34 This stage may involve varying levels
of scientific, political and economic uncertainty.35 The second stage involves the
forming of the game, whereby states negotiate an agreement and create monitoring
and compliance procedures.36 Indeed, it is here that states change the payoff
structure of cooperation by creating commitments, making concessions, and
establishing compliance procedures.37 The third stage is where states play the
game.38 Here, states implement and enforce the agreement, and individual
participants choose to either cooperate or pollute. 39 At this stage, a well-crafted

agreement should include the flexibility to respond to exogenous influences that
change the nature of the game. For example, scientific uncertainty may slowly
dissolve, transaction costs may diminish, and technological advancements may be
revealed.40 In this way, parties to an agreement need not go back to the drawing
board to reform and reframe the game - a process that we shall see, is extremely
difficult.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 681,683.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 724
Id. at 724-25.
Id.
Id.at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729-30.
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Indeed, a close examination of the Montreal Protocol provides an example of
how states successfully framed the game; changed the formation of the game by
negotiating the implementation of effective treaty mechanisms; and continue to
play the game by changing payoffs through both positive incentive and
punishment, and jointly encouraging participation and compliance.
III.

THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL:

A MODEL

OF SUCCESS?

A. NegotiationsLeading up to the Montreal Protocol
In 1974, Marion Molina and Sherwood Rowland published a scientific paper
suggesting that the stratospheric ozone layer was being destroyed by
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a man-made chemical substance. 41 Although the
causal link between the release of CFCs and the depletion of the ozone was largely
unproved in the late 1970s, many countries began to unilaterally reduce and restrict
CFC production and consumption.42 However, despite significant unilateral action
on the part of major contributors, such as the United States, CFC production and
consumption began to rise in the 1980s, necessitating the need for international
cooperation in protecting the ozone layer by phasing out the use of harmful ozone
depleting substances.43 In 1981, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
established a Working Group of legal and technical experts to agree on and draft a
global framework convention.44 The resulting Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention) was adopted and signed by
twenty countries plus the European Union, and entered into force on September 22,
1988. 45 Although the convention included no binding controls on the production
and emission of ozone depleting substances, the Vienna Convention played a
pivotal role in creating a foundation on which significant progress has been made.
Indeed, at the Convention the parties agreed to: (1) conduct further scientific
research and assessments to overcome uncertainty, (2) to exchange information for
the benefit of all participants, and (3) to adopt "appropriate measures" to deal with
the problem.4 6

41. Mario J. Molina & F. S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes. Chlorine
Atomcatalysed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974); see also DAVID HUNTER, JAMES
SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 567-69 ( 3rd

ed.

2007) (discussing the basic science of ozone depletion). When released CFCs rise to the stratosphere,
long exposure to solar radiation causes the CFCs to break down and release chlorine, which is the
source of ozone depletion, not the CFCs themselves. The consequence of ozone destruction is both lifethreatening and massive in scale because it is the ozone layer that absorbs harmful ultraviolet radiation.
An excess of UV radiation would result in increased cases of skin cancer and eye cataracts, lower yields
in agriculture and fisheries, and an accelerated increase in ground level ozone (smog), among other
disastrous effects.
42. Barrett, supra note 11, at 223.
43. Id.
44. Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 89, 136

(1998).
45. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097,
1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
46. See also id. arts 2-7, annex I-II; Frischmann, supra note 16, at 792.
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Frischmann maintains that this was an important first step "because it broadly
framed the relevant issues at a time where the underlying problem and potential
solutions were relatively uncertain and States were understandably hesitant to
undertake specific commitments. 47 Indeed, parties to the convention "fully
expected that their commitments would evolve over time, ' 48 and articulated that a
protocol with more specific obligations and targets would be negotiated in the

future.
B. The MontrealProtocol:An Assessment
On September 16, 1987, twenty-four states signed the Montreal Protocol,
which expanded the goals of the Vienna Convention by creating a treaty that
obligated parties to reduce their ozone depleting substance emissions in relation to
1986 base-levels. 49 From the outset, the negotiating parties to the Montreal
Protocol recognized the existence of scientific uncertainty and, hence, placed no
specific limit on any of these harmful substances. However, the negotiators did
create a separate limit for the total amount of ozone depletion caused by the parties
to the Protocol. 50 In this way, the negotiators built sufficient flexibility into the
functioning of the Montreal Protocol. Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator
to the Montreal Protocol, also maintains that the Montreal protocol was designed
to be flexible "to be reopened and adjusted as needed, on the basis of the
periodically scheduled scientific, economic, environmental, and technological
assessments., 51 Thus, as scientific data progressed, the parties began to implement
direct controls on specific substances through subsequent amendments. 52
The Montreal Protocol also implemented two important provisions during the
framing of the agreement. The first was the ability to "adjust" reduction targets,
ideally by consensus, but if necessary, by two-thirds majority of the parties
representing at least half of the total consumption of all the parties.5 3 Such
adjustments are binding on all parties even on non-consenting parties.5 4 The

47. Frischmann, supra note 16, at 792 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 2, Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 52
Fed. Reg. 47515, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol]; see also Nanda & Pring, supranote 15, at 259. Interestingly, 1986 was chosen as a base-level
to avoid strategic maneuvering by states to increase their production so as to change their bargaining
positions. Had a future year been chosen, this might have encouraged many countries to increase their
production levels immediately to establish a higher basis from which subsequent cuts would have to be
made. In subsequent amendments, the base-level year was changed for many controlled substances as a
response to scientific data.
50. Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 259-60.
51. Benedick, supra note 6, at 99. We can see that this has indeed happened and the assessments
still form a major part in process of decision-making.
52. To date, the Montreal Protocol has undergone many transformations: Adjusted in Vienna
(1995); amended in Beijing (1999); adjusted and amended in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), and
Montreal (1997). Therefore, a country that joins the Montreal Protocol today is joining a very different
treaty from the one negotiated in 1987. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 140-44; Barrett, supra note 11, at
153.
53. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 2, 9.
54. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 226.
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second provision was that the ability to broaden the agreement to include new
substances would have to be included through treaty amendments and, hence,
would be legally binding on parties to any such amendment.5 5 In this way, the
parties created institutional mechanisms that would adjust commitment levels and
payoff structures in response to unforeseen developments without requiring
56
renegotiation of the underlying game.
From the beginning, the Montreal Protocol also created a weighted list of
chemicals with ozone depleting potentials.57 As a result, the Montreal Protocol
created incentives to reduce the more harmful ozone depleting substances at a
higher rate than those that were less damaging to the ozone. In creating emissions
-offsets," the weighted list effectively lowered the cost of compliance associated
with binding obligations. 58 Additionally, since 1987, as scientific knowledge has
improved, the parties to the Montreal Protocol have increased the number of
controlled substances from eight to ninety-six. 59
1. Trade Leakage Concerns
A major concern for the negotiators of Montreal was the potential for "trade
leakage," whereby the production of ozone depleting substances would merely
shift from the parties to the Protocol to non-parties, in other words, from the
industrialized countries to the developing countries.60 Under such a scenario, the
Montreal Protocol would only serve to redistribute, rather than reduce, the
production and consumption of ozone depleting substances. In this way, trade
leakage would merely serve to increase the payoffs for non-cooperation, and
hence, would undermine participation and compliance. From the outset of
negotiations, the parties therefore worked hard to include measures to stop trade
leakage.6 Negotiations, focused on two solutions: (1) to create incentives for
developing countries to also assume obligations for the public good, and (2) to
implement tough trade measures to encourage participation.6 2 However, this did
not prove to be easy. Specifically, developing countries felt that they were
responsible for only a small portion of the ozone problem, and therefore argued
55. See Montreal Protocol supra note 49, art. 2, 1 9(d). This is helpful in that if, at the time of
negotiation, parties are uncertain as to the future environmental implications, and if at the time parties
expect this uncertainty to diminish, then countries may wish to negotiate an initial agreement that keeps
the option ofrenegotiation open in the future.
56. Recall Frischmann's three stages of the treaty negotiation game, supra text section II(C).
57. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, annex A.
58. Benedick, supra note 6, at 78.
59. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, annex A C. The most common controlled substances
include: Halo carbons, notably chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons; Carbon tetrachloride; Methyl
chloroform (1,1,1 trichloroethane); Hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs); Hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs); Methyl bromide (CH3Br); and Bromochloromethane (BCM), a new ozone-depleting
substance that some companies sought to introduce into the market in 1998, which has been targeted by
the 1999 Beijing Amendment for immediate phase-out to prevent its use.
60. Barrett, supra note 11, at 231; see also HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 58485.
61. Benedick, supra note 6, at 91-92.
62. Barrett, supra note 11, at 231, 313, 321, 346-49 (discussing the specific mechanisms
introduced to address these concerns).
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63
that they should not be held to the same standards as the industrialized countries.
After lengthy negotiations, the parties settled on mechanisms such as "basic
domestic needs," under which developing counties (Article 5 countries) could
increase their ozone depleling substances production to specified levels for ten
years, after which they were subject to a fifty percent reduction for the next ten
years.64 In 1992, the parties to the Montreal Protocol also created a comprehensive
funding mechanism to support efforts to develop "cleaner" technology. 65 These
actions simultaneously strengthened control measures by creating incentive for
developing countries to ratify, and increased the number of parties to the Montreal
66
Protocol by improving the cost-benefit positions of most developing countries.
As a result, we can see that the parties to the Montreal Protocol ensured that
payoffs for participation and compliance increased, and payoffs for noncooperation diminished. Importantly, these incentives effectively countered the
Prisoner's Dilemma, and subtly helped to shift states' dominant strategy from one
of defection (continued pollution) to one of abatement.

2. Trade Restriction Mechanisms
The parties also managed to create robust trade restriction measures that
effectively created favorable cost-benefit structures for states that were considering
whether to join the Montreal Protocol.67 In this way, the trade restriction
mechanism made participation individually rational for countries. 68 Again, by
implementing these restriction mechanisms the parties to the Montreal Protocol
diminished the potential payoff structure of non-cooperation and reformulated the
environment (or game) within which countries had choose to cooperate or not.
Ultimately, trade restriction effectively deterred free-riding and restructured

63. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 16.
64. Id. at 17. The phase out schedules for developed countries are as follows: Phase out Halons
by 1994; phase out CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and HBFCs by 1996; reduce methyl
bromide by 25% by 1999, 50% by 2001, 70% by 2003, and phase out by 2005; reduce HCFCs by 35%
by 2004, 65% by 2010, 90% by 2015, and 99.5% by 2020, with 0.5% permitted for maintenance
purposes only until 2030; phase out HBFCs by 1996 and phase out BCM immediately. See Multilateral
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, About the Multilateral Fund: History,
http://www.multilateralfund.org/history.htm.
65. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 17. Currently, the Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol is
administered by an Executive Committee of seven developed and seven developing countries chosen by
the Parties on annual basis. The Fund has been replenished six times: $240 million (1991-1993), $455
million (1994-1996), $466 million (1997-1999), $440 million (2000-2002), $474 million (2003-2005)
and $400.4 (2006-2008). The total budget for the 2006-2008 triennium is $470 million. $59.6 million of
that budget is from the 2003-2005 triennium and $10 million will be provided from interest accruing to
the Multilateral Fund during the 2006-2008 triennium. As of March 2007, the contributions made to the
Multilateral Fund by some forty-nine industrialized countries (including Countries with Economies in
Transition or CEIT countries) totaled over U.S.$ 2.2 billion. See Multilateral Fund for the
History,
Fund:
Multilateral
About the
Montreal
Protocol,
of the
Implementation
http://www.multilateralfund.org/history.htm.
66. Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 265-66.
67. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 4.
68. Recall Barrett's three requirements for a successful environmental treaty, supra text section 1.
Barret, supra note 11, at xiii-xiv.
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incentives to encourage broad and deep participation. 69 Specifically, the Montreal
Protocol prohibits parties from importing controlled substances and products
produced with controlled substances from non-parties.70 In addition, the Montreal
Protocol bans parties from exporting controlled substances unless the recipient
country can show full compliance with the Protocol's reduction schedules. 7 To
discourage countries from holding out for short-term competitive advantage, the
parties also agreed that the Protocol would only enter into force when eleven
countries, representing two-thirds of global ozone depleting substances
consumption, had ratified.72

3. Implementation and Non-compliance
In 1997, in the Copenhagen Amendments, focus shifted from target setting to
effective implementation.7 3 The parties focused on increasing participation,
limiting the growth of emissions by developing countries, promoting universal
compliance, and controlling the emerging black market trade in CFCs. 74 Indeed,
the Montreal Amendments created institutional mechanisms to determine, and
effectively deal with, non-compliance, thereby making it collectively rational for
the parties to comply with their obligation.75 Specifically, the parties created an
Implementation Committee that has both a dispute resolution element and an
implementation element to make compliance issues fair to all the parties.76

Measures that can be taken under the Montreal Protocol for non-compliance
include:
(1) assistance [in the form of financial and technological assistance];
(2) "issuing cautions"; and
(3) suspension... of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol...
including those concerned with industrial rationalization, production,
consumption, trade, transfer of technology, financial mechanisms and
institutional arrangements.

77

69. Also, because of such enforcement mechanisms, the Montreal Protocol suffers from virtually
no free-riding. Indeed, after the trade restrictions were put into place, the number of developing
countries that joined the Montreal Protocol increased rapidly.
70. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 584-85.
71. Id.
72 E.g., id. at 586. As it turned out, the initial participation far exceeded this number in that 30
parties representing 83 percent of global consumption were founding parties to the Montreal Protocol.
73. Barrett, supra note 11, at 237. Again, recall Barrett's three requirements for a successful
environmental treaty, supra text section I.
74. See Adjustments and Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer Adopted at Copenhagen, Nov. 25, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-9, 32 I.L.M. 874
(1993) (entered into force June 14, 1994) [hereinafter Copenhagen Amendments].
75. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 603-06.
76. See Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 74.
77. Barrett, supra note 11, at 288; UNEP, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone LaYer, Annex V, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15
(November 25, 1992), availableat http://www.unep.org/ozone/4mop-cph.shtml.
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Indeed, by approaching the Implementation Committee, a party can request
assistance from other parties to meet its obligations. 78 This approach, therefore,
recognizes the need for collective action and assistance in solving the ozone
problem. In addition, the Montreal Protoc6l requires that parties submit reports
with data on import, exports and production of controlled substances to the
Implementation Committee. 79 The Implementation Committee has worked
extremely hard to enforce this reporting requirement, frequently threatening to
withhold critical financial assistance to Article 5 8countries
(developing countries)
0
requirement.
reporting
the
with
comply
not
that do
Thus, we can see that the framers of the Vienna Convention and the
accompanying Montreal Protocolframedandformed the game to maximize payoff

structures of cooperation. In addition, the parties to the Montreal Protocol created
an agreement that allows each party to continue to play the game, with a high level
of certainty that other states will do the same. Indeed, despite what other countries
may chose to do, each country's dominant strategy under the Montreal Protocol
remains participation and full compliance. As a result, there is almost full
compliance and participation in
the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent
81
increase.
to
continue
amendments
IV. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
A. Similaritieswith MontrealProtocol
This paper has already described the similarities between the nature of ozone
depletion and climate change. Despite these similarities, it should be noted that
climate change mitigation raises a much greater challenge than that presented by
ozone depletion. First, climate change is a much more difficult phenomenon to
regulate because it is more scientifically complex than ozone depletion and is still
characterized by high uncertainty and sharp asymmetrical vulnerabilities.8 2 Indeed,
this uncertainty still plagues global efforts to reach consensus on lasting climate
change alleviation. 3 Perhaps more important, is the fact that climate change
mitigation affects core global economic activity and inherently involves issues of

78. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 10.
79. Id., art. 7; see also Barret, supra note 11, at 149.
80. The Montreal Protocol has a discrete approach to non-compliance and monitoring. Suspected
instances of non-compliance must be brought to the Implementation Committee, which reviews the
evidence and considers the circumstances that may have precipitated the non-compliance. It then makes
recommendations regarding actions to be taken. In a sense, therefore, the process may encourage noncompliance, but the careful exercise of discretion may also prevent the punishment of a country that has
a legitimate reason beyond its control for non-compliance. See generally Barrett, supra note 11, at 15051.
81. As of June 2008, 193 countries have ratified the Montreal Protocol. Ratifications of the
amendments are: 189 countries for the London Amendments, 184 for the Copenhagen Amendments,
167 for the Montreal Amendments, 144 for the Beijing Amendments. Ozone Secretariat, supra note 4.
82. Thomas, supra note 3, at 823; see also Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2-4, 45.
83. Thomas, supra note 3, at 824. It should be noted that while scientific uncertainty within the
climate change regime has diminished with time, a significant obstacle to a lasting agreement is still
presented by a high degree of uncertainty regarding the economic impacts associated with proposed
global responses.

2009

MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

competition between nations . 4 Specifically, climate change alleviation implicates
multiple sectors of the global economy, particularly those that have, throughout
85
modem history, served as the backbone to industrial growth and development.
While it is conceptually accepted that mitigation of climate change calls for the
restructuring of our global energy-based society, this in itself is not enough.
Indeed, it is the necessity of cheap energy as a foundation to growth and
development in less-developed countries that illustrates a particularly acute
86
problem, at least in climate change negotiation.
Despite the differences between climate change and ozone depletion, the
response to the two environmental challenges nevertheless share many common
elements. First, the extent of scientific cooperation and involvement in climate
change negotiations has been just as great, if not greater, than that of the ozone
regime.8 7 Second, climate change negotiation also followed an incremental
approach through the use of a convention-protocol scheme, and the creation of
targets and timetables to create binding emissions reduction standards.88 Third, like
Montreal, the negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol advanced the "common but
differentiated responsibility" principle, and created multiple mechanisms to
encourage and aid developing countries to participate.8 9 As we shall see, however,
despite these similarities between the two Protocols, key differences have exposed
many fundamental problems with the current Kyoto regime. Specifically,
differences concerning treaty negotiations, structure, and institutional mechanisms
have led to a vastly different outcome that must be addressed and amended in order
to sustain lasting climate change mitigation.
B. The Early Response to Climate Change
Despite the remarkable response to the problems of ozone depletion, the
world has yet to adequately respond to climate change - the "defining ecological
issue of the 2 1 st century." 90 Over the past two decades, scientific consensus has
established that increasing levels of man-made greenhouse gases being released
into the atmosphere are causing global warming and changing the earth's fragile
climate. 9 1 Even before such consensus was reached, many scientists called for
84. Id. at 823.
85. See id. at 812.
86. Id. at 824-25.
87. Id. at 817; see also JORGEN WETTESTAD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
THE KEY CONDITIONS 221-23 (1999) (noting that the climate change has an "'extraordinarily welldeveloped scientific-political complex, with several organizational entities and bodies fulfilling
advisory and communicatory functions.").
88. Nanda and Pring, supra note 15, at 293-94.
89. For a discussion on the common but differentiated responsibility approach, see Kyle Danish,
An Overview of the InternationalRegime Addressing Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL'Y
10(2007).
90. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 631.
91. Climate change refers to the change in the earth's climate brought about by increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases, which at normal levels are actually indispensable to life on earth.
However, due to man-induced pollution problems, the delicate balance of greenhouse gases is being
affected, and is, in turn, causing the earth's temperature to rise. These gases earn their name because,
much like a greenhouse, they allow sunlight to pass through the atmosphere while trapping heat, or
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international action back in the 1970s and 1980S. 9 2 Indeed, after the danger of manmade greenhouse gases became more apparent, many industrialized countries
committed to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, but unlike the same
unilateral commitments for ODSs, many countries did not follow through with
concrete action.93 The first major effort to regulate climate change took place in
1992, with the creation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),
signed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. 94 The FCCC did not include any binding
measures or obligations, but it did establish a general framework on which further
action was taken. 95 In 1997, in response to scientific evidence that emphasized the
need for binding targets and timetables, the parties to the FCCC negotiated the
Kyoto Protocol to the Convention on Climate Change.96 As we shall see, however,
the Kyoto Protocol has been the target of widespread criticism, and has had very
little success at mitigating climate change.
C. The Kyoto Protocol:An Assessment
In February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force without the
participation of the United States.97 Despite U.S. withdrawal, the parties hailed this
as a milestone in the global effort to mitigate climate change.9 8 This does not,
however, deter scholars from severely criticizing the Kyoto Protocol. Specifically,
scholars argue that under the current provisions of the Protocol, impacts on global
emissions will be negligible. For example, Olmstead and Stavins maintain:
"[b]ecause the Kyoto Protocol's ambitious targets apply only to the short term
(2008-2012) and only to industrialized nations, the agreement will impose
relatively high costs and generate only modest short-term benefits, while failing to
provide a real solution." 99 While this condemnation has enjoyed widespread
support among scholars, the most common criticism of the Kyoto Protocol can be
summarized in four propositions:

infra-red radiation, close to the earth's surface. Thus, an increase in the concentration of greenhouse
gases leads to increased warming, which in turn is adversely effecting the earth's fragile environment.
Harmful chemicals that have led to increased greenhouse gas concentrations include: carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, halocarbons (regulated by Montreal), and other halogenated substances such as
CFCs and HCFCs.
92. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 632.
93. Barrett, supra note 11, at 367.
94. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature May 29, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 24, 1994), [hereinafter UNFCCC].
95. Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 290-94 (noting that the basis for international law to address
climate change is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration).
96. HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 41, at 632.
97. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. As of
October 16, 2008, there were 182 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of
Ratification, supra note 7.
98.
99. Robert N. Stavins & Sheila M. Olmstead, An InternationalPolicy Architecturefor the PostKyoto Era, 96 AM. EcON. REV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 35, 35 (2006), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/4014/international-policy-architecture
for the-postkyot
o_era.html.
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1. Negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol were politically
motivated and led to diluted targets that will have very little effect on
climate change.l°°
2. The non-inclusion of developing countries in binding targets
undermines the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol."0
3. The cost-benefit structure of the Kyoto Protocol undermines its
10 2
effectiveness and encourages non-participation.
4. Ineffective enforcement mechanisms help to encourage lackluster
10 3
results and encourage free-riding and trade leakage.
1. Negotiations Leading up to The Kyoto Protocol
Right from the start of negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol presented a more
complex political problem than that experienced during the Montreal negotiations.
However, it wasn't until the U.S. made public its intention not to become a party to
the agreement that the real problems associated with the negotiations started to
surface. 104 In 2001, after several years of negotiations between the U.S. and the
other parties to the Kyoto Protocol, President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S.
from the Kyoto Protocol, invoking great dissatisfaction from the rest of the
world. 10 5 The U.S. maintained that it would not sign the Kyoto Protocol (1) unless
developing countries were included, and (2) as long as the U.S. considered it to be
harmful to its economic interests. 106 The U.S. Senate concluded that any
"exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global
action on climate change and is environmentally flawed" and strongly believed
that proposals leading up the Kyoto Protocol "could result in serious harm to the

100. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 371-74.
101. See generally Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4-7; Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But
Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate Regime: Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include
Annex C and the Annex C MitigationFund, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 248-51 (2007).
102. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 377-80.
103. See Bohringer & Finus, supra note 17, at 279, 284, 294 (highlighting that more realistic and
effective punishments can provide incentives for compliance, and that strategic links among countries
can counter trade leakage). Recall discussion, supra text section III(B)(1).
104. See generally Oh no, Kyoto, THE EcONOMIST, April 7, 2001. (discussing the reactions after
the U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto, and the difficulties that soon became apparent after the withdrawal).
105. Barrett, supra note 11, at 371; see also Sunstein supra note 1, at 28 (suggesting that leading up
to the creation of the final draft of the treaty, it was common knowledge that the U.S. could never join
the treaty as drafted).
106. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong.
1 (1998),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c105:1:./temp/-clO5F6Lwz2::. It should be noted that, despite the frequent accusations of
partisan political approaches, the U.S.'s involvement was virtually doomed from the start, even before
President Bush came into office. In fact, even during the Clinton Administration the Senate voted 95-0
against joining the Kyoto Protocol. Despite this, however, it should be recognized that many scholars
argue that it was the way in which President Bush withdrew that increased the dissatisfaction felt by
other parties at the U.S. withdrawal. E.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 371.
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United States economy, including significant job loss, trade 107disadvantages,
increased energy and consumer costs, or any combination thereof."
Despite the obvious problems associated with the non-participation of the
U.S. in a global action to mitigate climate change, 10 8 several prominent scholars
also point to the resulting concessions made in an effort to save the Kyoto Protocol

from an early death.10 9 Specifically, in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal, many
Annex 1 countries enjoyed significantly more bargaining power and effectively

renegotiated the Kyoto Protocol, resulting in a vast downgrade of original
targets. 110 Such downgrading included large concessions concerning "sinks" and
"hot air" trading."ll With the addition of hot air trading, the Kyoto Protocol allows
countries to purchase credits from countries that have achieved surplus reductions.
While many defend this as an effective mechanism to encourage participation,
allowances have been subject to vast abuse and mismanagement. 112 For example,
after the U.S. withdrew, Russia was able to negotiate double the amount of sink
credits permitted toward calculations of its emissions.1

13

In this way, the hot air

trading scheme undermines the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol by merely
shifting excess surplus to countries that are not meeting target reductions, with the
end-result being that total emissions reduction is significantly diluted.'1 14 Ironically,
the determination of the remaining parties to make Kyoto work also led to
concessions 15on a number of issues that the U.S. had lobbied for prior to its
withdrawal.
Another example of how politics drove the negotiations leading up to Kyoto
is that choosing the year 1990 as the base level for reductions conferred significant
advantages for many of the negotiating parties. 1 6 Specifically, during the

107. S. Res. 98, supra note 106, paras. 10-1 1.
108. See Parker & Blodgett, supra note 9, at summary (showing that the U.S. emits roughly 20
percent of global GHGs); see also Oh no, Kyoto, supra note 104.
109. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 11, at 371-74; see also Thomas, supra note 3, at 821.
110. See Scott Barrett, Kyoto Plus, in CLIMATE-CHANGE POLICY, supranote 16, at 295.
111. Barrett, supra note 11, at 371. Another example of the weakening of the Kyoto Protocol is that
countries like Canada, in acceding, have actually unilaterally claimed credits (in the case of Canada 30 percent credit for exports of "clean" energy to the U.S.). Hot air refers to the surplus of emission
reduction for the former communist countries of Europe. For example, Russia is required to stabilize
(0 % increase) its emissions under the Kyoto agreement, but. in actual fact its emissions in 2000 were
roughly 70 percent of the 1990 level. With the surplus emission reduction, other countries can trade
with Russia to comply with their obligation; in other words, not by reducing emissions, but by paying
Russia to transfer a portion of its surplus. Barrett, supra note 110, at 294.
112. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 371-74.
113. Thomas, supra note 3, at 821.
114. Id.
115. Barrett, supra note 11, at 371; see also Nanda & Pring, supra note 15, at 294-300 (discussing
the U.S.'s position during the Kyoto negotiations and its subsequent decision to withdraw from Kyoto).
116. Richard Benedick, Morals and Myths: A Commentary on Global Climate Policy, 109 WZBMITTEILUNGEN 15, 15 (2005). The UK's official target was 8 percent, but in 1997 its emissions were
actually 5 percent lower than 1990. In addition, Russia's target was 100 percent of 1990, but its actual
emissions were at least 30 percent below that level due to the collapse of communism. In contrast, the
United States, which was enjoying a period of huge economic boom, was by 1997 emitting greenhouse
gases at a 12 percent increase from 1990 levels. Interestingly, this created a desire by the United States
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negotiations of the Kyoto terms, a group of thirty industrialized nations agreed to
reduce their combined GHG emissions by five percent of 1990 levels by 2012.
However, in 1997, the combined emissions of these countries were already three
percent below 1990 levels.11 7 Indeed, many nations at the time knew they would
not have to undergo significant reductions to meet the target, with the exception of
1 8
the United States, which had enjoyed a period of economic boom in the 1990s. 1
Richard Benedick believes that the basic underlying problem with Kyoto was
a lack of genuine political will on all sides. After years of wrangling
over further weakening its provisions, the treaty finally became law in
2005, but the self-congratulations could not disguise that its impact on
global emissions is negligible and its short-term orientation makes it
19
impossible for industry to plan long-term investments.
In sum, because of the negotiation process, the parties to the Protocol
eventually signed and ratified a significantly diluted treaty. Moreover, unlike the
successful framing of the game which created a conducive environment during the
early days of the Montreal Protocol, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol have created
an environment where costs are significantly different for states, where the U.S.
has a dominant strategy to continue polluting, and where even participating
countries have incentive to ignore their obligations.
2. The Exclusion of Developing Countries from Binding Targets
The Kyoto Protocol currently imposes quantitative restrictions on
industrialized countries, but does not impose similar obligations on developing
countries. 120 Although the Montreal Protocol had to overcome the same difficulties
with regards to developing nation participation, the Montreal Protocol was
successful in adopting a more rational sequential approach to negotiations. First,
the parties to Montreal focused on creating binding targets for industrialized
nations and hence tackled the most pressing issue first.12' Only then did the parties
turn to the sensitive but secondary issue of developing world participation. The
negotiators therefore managed to solve the common but differentiated
responsibility dilemma by separating the two fundamental issues of industrial
commitments and developing world commitments. At the Kyoto negotiations,
however, the issue of developing world participation became entangled with
negotiations over binding targets in the industrial world. As Laura Thomas states,
"the climate change negotiations have taken an 'inclusive' approach in which both

to secure an emissions trading scheme, so that it could essentially make up for its projected inability to
comply with the targets by buying emissions credits from Russia. At the same time, the EU opposed
(and correctly so) such a scheme under the pretext that it would easily meet its emissions targets.
However, after U.S. withdrawal, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol nevertheless included an emissions
trading scheme. Then, when it became clear that the EU would not likely meet its obligatory targets, it
actively enticed Russia to ratify in order to gain access to its excess emissions credits. Id.
117. Id.at 15.
118. Id.at 16.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 97, annex B; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 370.
121. Thomas, supra note 3, at 837-39.
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industrialized and developing nations have been involved in the negotiating
process."' 122 Compounding the problem, many industrialized nations have been
reticent to agree to meaningful binding targets without the simultaneous
participation of developing countries. 123 In this way, misplaced focus on the
developing world undermined and significantly diluted negotiations that should
have been focused solely on binding targets for industrialized countries. Indeed,
involvement of developing countries in the initial negotiations undermined the
parties' ability to form and frame a clear and foreseeable series of iterations (or
games representing different stages of agreement), through which uncertainty
would not have undermined cooperation.
The inclusion of binding targets for the developing world, albeit at a later
stage, is necessary to the long run effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. The
argument for imposing mandatory obligations on developing countries is not that
their exclusion is unfair, but rather, that a partial agreement (one not including
developing countries) is environmentally ineffective and costly at the same time
because the Annex 1 industrial countries would presumably undertake significant
costs only to see emissions migrate to developing countries. 12 4 In addition to
concerns for production shifting, many critics point out that without the
participation of developing nations, particularly those with high growth rates, the
125
Kyoto Protocol will have a negligible effect on global greenhouse gas emissions.
It is significant that eight of the top twenty emitter countries are rapidly
industrializing, highly competitive "developing" countries. 126 Moreover. India's
greenhouse gas emissions exceed Germany's, those of South Korea exceed France,
127
and China recently became the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world.
Yet, none of these countries is obligated to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. While
many development scholars argue that the industrialized countries need to lead by
example, Barrett counters that leading by example is fundamentally flawed
because, if the current parties obligated under Kyoto do succeed in reducing their
emissions substantially, the costs paid by their respective industries will rise and
the incentive for other countries (developing countries) will fall because of a shift
in comparative advantage, or leakage. 12 In addition, it is generally the case that

122. Id. at 839.
123. Id.
124. Barrett, supra note 11, at 305. The concept of trade leakage is discussed supra text section
III(B)(1).
125. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 821-22.
126. See Parker & Blodgett, supra note 9, app. A.
127. Id.; see China Tops U.S. in Greenhouse Gas, Group Finds, N.Y.TIMES, June 21, 2007, at A;
see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem. 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 905 (2008)
(discussing how to create incentives for China and the United States to make prompt, large emissions
reductions in light of the fact that they are the two largest emitters of GHGs).
128. Barrett, supra note 110, at 283-84. It should be noted that the author does not mean to
undermine the reality that the industrialized countries are certainly responsible for the vast majority of
the increase in GHG emissions over the past few decades, and that they need to take on significant costs
as a result. This paper merely seeks to point out that developing nations collectively will soon overtake
the industrialized (Annex 1) countries in global GHG emissions, and hence, must become part of a
long-term solution.
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wider participation in environmental treaties significantly lowers the cost to each
individual country participant. 129 To put the exclusion of developing nations into
perspective, Scott Barrett highlights that:
[T]he Kyoto Protocol would only limit the emissions of about 30 of the
world's 200 or so countries by only about 5 per cent for a period of just
5 years. Even if Kyoto worked as intended, the emissions of the
countries unconstrained by the agreement would rise, making it very

unlikely that Kyoto would even stabilize global emissions, let alone
reduce them, even over such a short period. 3
3. Unfavorable Cost-benefit Structures of Participation
Undoubtedly, one of the largest factors undermining the Kyoto Protocol is
that, under the current terms, the treaty has an unfavorable cost-benefit structure.
Mitigating climate change will present the industrialized nations with
"unprecedented challenges, because it can only be achieved through extraordinary
changes in the production and consumption of energy, thus affecting virtually all
'
areas of economic activity... 131
This cost cannot be avoided, and must be
undertaken by the global community to begin to reverse the effects of global
warming. However, under the current climate change regime, incentives are not
structured to minimize non-cooperation payoff structures and do not coincide with
the optimum cost-benefit positions. 132 Bohringer and Finus argue that "decisionmaking in climate policy requires balancing total costs of greenhouse-gas-emission
abatement and total benefits of avoided undesirable consequences of global
warming." 133 They also note that abatement costs are equalized across time.134 That
is, abatement should be undertaken when it is cheapest and most effective, taking
into account that such abatement costs can lower as technology progresses. Such
arguments suggest that the Kyoto should create targets and timetables that are
sensitive to the immediate high costs of such reductions, with the aim of increasing
target reductions as costs start to fall.
To add to this, Barrett and Sustein argue that the Kyoto Protocol needs to
restructure its payoffs to create incentives for wide participation and to encourage
compliance. 135 This is based on the premise that the current climate change regime
presents a Prisoner's Dilemma, where the dominant strategy is to pollute (or fail to
comply). Instead, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol need to create an environment
that is more reflective of that present in a game of Harmony, where the dominant
strategy is cooperation or abatement. Remember, in a choice between continuing to

129. Id. at 304.
130. Barrett, supra note 110, at 288.
131. See Rudiger Wolfrum & Jurgen Friedrich, The Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the Kyoto

Protocol, in ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND ACADEMIA 53, 53 (Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-

Tobias Stoll & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
132. Bohringer & Finus, supra note 17, at 254-55 (discussing optimum cost-benefit positions).
133. Id. at 254.
134. Id. at 255.
135. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 389.
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pollute and abating pollution, countries will choose to do that which presents a
higher payoff. 136 It is, therefore, imperative that the climate change regime
improve incentives to cooperate or diminish payoffs associated with noncooperation.
One suggestion is the inclusion of trade restriction mechanisms similar to
those under the Montreal Protocol. 137 Article IV of the Montreal Protocol
successfully led to increased country participation by providing market incentives
to join and diminishing the payoff structure of non-cooperation by deterring trade
leakage. Indeed, because the industrialized countries did not have to worry about
trade leakage, they were far more willing to accept binding targets with the
knowledge that trade restrictions, coupled with financial incentives, would
encourage broader participation at a later stage. 13 8 The Kyoto protocol, however,
includes no such trade restrictions, and industrialized countries do not enjoy the
security of assured mutual participation. The inclusion of trade restriction
mechanisms would ultimately reform and reframe the game by assuring higher
expectations of compliance in others. In this way, the Prisoner's Dilemma faced by
most parties to the Kyoto Protocol, could be changed to represent a situation more
like the game of Harmony.
An examination of the underlying reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol offers convincing proof of the need for renewed incentives to
encourage participation. Sustein argues that the cost-benefit of participating and
complying with the Kyoto Protocol suggest that the U.S. should not comply with

the Kyoto Protocol even if all other countries do. Sustein states:
To the United States, the monetized benefits of the Montreal Protocol
dwarfed the monetized costs, and hence the circumstances were
extremely promising for American support.... The Kyoto Protocol
presented a radically different picture... the monetized benefits of the
Kyoto Protocol would be dwarfed by the monetized costs.. .Hence the

circumstances were unpromising for a successful agreement - and they
were especially unpromising for American participation... 39
'

It is plausible to suggest that the U.S. will only participate in an agreement
that leads to at least a convergence of the perceived domestic costs of emission
reductions with that of the perceived domestic benefits from such reduction. 140 In
136. For a more complete discussion on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its application to multilateral
environmental treaties see generally Barrett, supra note 11, at 53-61, 196, 290.
137. It should be noted, however, that a trade restriction mechanism would be far more difficult to
create and manage than that created for ODSs; however, some scholars have proposed that it is certainly
possible. One thing is clear - the Kyoto Protocol could certainly benefit from "a better integration of the
two competing realms of international trade and environmental law." Thomas, supra note 3, at 850.
138. Id.
139. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 5-6. This cost-benefit analysis also helps to explain why there are
different levels of compliance between the Montreal Protocol (which enjoys near perfect compliance)
and the Kyoto Protocol (which is known to suffer from widespread non-compliance).
140. WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD 162-68 (2000). Norhaus and
Boyer tabulated the costs associated with the U.S. involvement in Kyoto. According to them, for the
U.S., under a treaty that involves a trading scheme, the cost of compliance would be roughly $325
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this regard, convergence will take place when the climate change regime creates
incentives that either increase the benefits of participation (mitigating the cost of
participation) or increase the cost of non-participation.It is in the latter notion of
increasing the costs of non-participation that the current regime can affect the most
change. Again, a good example is the inclusion of trade restriction measures like
those under the Montreal Protocol, which effectively create an incentive for
countries to participate, and impose significant costs on non-participation.
4. Unfavorable Cost-benefit Structures of Compliance
With the notable exception of the U.S., and the non-binding obligations
imposed on developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol enjoys a significant
participation with 174 parties. But is this enough? The majority of literature
devoted to answering this question maintains that it is not. Indeed, several critics
point to the fact that despite the broad participation in the Kyoto Protocol by
industrialized nations, compliance remains largely weak.141 The larger point is,
therefore, that despite significant participation, climate change issues are not being
adequately solved, bringing the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol into question.
Thus, in addition to broad participation, an effective multilateral
environmental agreement necessarily needs to "deepen" cooperation.' 42 Indeed,
many scholars argue that broad participation can, in fact, be a product of mostly
shallow cooperation.143 To deepen cooperation, a treaty or MEA must necessarily
design an effective compliance system to enforce commitments. Compliance
systems therefore play an important role in framing the rules of the game. Scholars
devoted to the study of compliance and enforcement advance two general
approaches to maintaining compliance: (1) an "enforcement approach" where noncompliance is deterred through the use of threats, sanctions and other methods of
punishment; and (2) a "management approach" where the parties clearly delineate
obligations and use positive incentives to encourage compliance with these
obligations. "'AWhile both approaches seek the same outcome, they use very
different means of ensuring such an outcome. Frischmann describes how the
enforcement approach uses a variety of "hard" sanctions (such as trade sanctions or
economic penalty), whereas the management approach uses a variety of "soft"
sanctions (such as noncompliance reports and privilege suspension). 45 A closer
look at the Montreal Protocol, however, illustrates that the two approaches are not

billion. In the same light, the benefits of complying with the Kyoto Protocol are estimated to be roughly
$12 billion. For the world as a whole, the costs are actually lower, standing at about $217 billion. On
the other hand, according to estimates, the cost of climate change globally stands to be around $4
trillion. As a result, it is difficult to doubt that any treaty that has the potential to mitigate such costs is
not a worthy goal; however, in the case of Kyoto, the net benefits are at best marginal because it will
only have a small effect on aggregate emissions worldwide.
141. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4; see also Parker & Blodgett, supra note 9, at 12.
142. See George Downs et al., Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?,
50 INT'L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
143. See, e.g., David G. Victor, Enforcing InternationalLaw: Implicationsfor an Effective Global
Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 147, 152 (1999).
144. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 16, at 737.
145. Id. at 738-39.
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necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, the Montreal Protocol's use of both
enforcement approaches ultimately plays a large role in ensuring almost full
compliance. For example, the trade restriction mechanism (hard sanction) helps to
encourage participation, while reporting requirements and technical assistance
(soft sanctions) help to undermine uncertainty and encourage compliance. 146 Why
then, can the Kyoto Protocol not adopt the same approach?
Shallow cooperation, at least concerning the Kyoto Protocol, is encouraged
because of the fact that enforcement mechanisms are not legally binding and can
only become legally binding by an amendment.1 47 Since any party can decline 1 to
48
ratify an amendment, it can avoid being punished for failing to comply.
Moreover, the current compliance mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, agreed
on in Bonn in 2001, are fundamentally flawed. It is even suggested that they
merely encourage non-compliance and might actually encourage nonparticipation.149 Currently, if a party does not meet its obligations it can be
"punished" in two ways: (1) by accepting additional reductions in its emissions
during the control period following the period in which the country failed to
comply, and (2) by being excluded from the emission trading scheme.1 5o Thus, the
enforcement mechanisms merely delay punishment and actually ignore the fact
that delayed penalties increase participation costs with each control period. In this
way, the non-compliance measures make non-participation more attractive. 151 This
does not mean that the Kyoto Protocol is incorrect for trying to encourage states to
comply with their obligations. On the contrary, "coercive enforcement measures
are sometimes needed, particularly when the cooperation is deep and incentives to
defect are high."' 5 2 This would suggest that there is a trade-off between
encouraging participation and deepening cooperation. The Montreal Protocol
provides a good example of a treaty that established a healthy balance between the
two: creating an optimum cost-benefit structure to encourage participation through
incentives, including adequate enforcement mechanisms to deepen cooperation.
Kyoto, on the other hand, has large participation, a sub-optimal cost-benefit
structure and inadequate enforcement mechanisms to encourage deeper
cooperation.

146. See id. at 797-804; Weiss, supra note 44, at 147, 152-53.
147. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 97, art. 20. Article 20 states that an amendment requires at least
three-fourths of the parties present and voting at the meeting.
148. Barrett, supra note 11, at 384.
149. Id. at 384, 386.
150. Id. at 386.
15 1. Id. Another flaw is that compliance relies on self-punishment, in that it is only legally binding
if a nation chooses to ratify any such amendment. Countries that are most likely to fall short of
compliance will be the very countries that are least likely to approve such an amendment.
152. Teall Crossen, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum, 16
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 493; see also Victor, supra note 143, at 151.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Scott Barrett sums up participation in the Kyoto Protocol as follows:
The USA failed to participate (at least in part) because the costs of
participation were high. Other countries agreed to participate (at least in
part) because the costs to them of participating were low (as is true for
some EU states), zero (as is true for all non-Annex I states) or even
negative (as is true for the states given 'hot air' allowances). The Annex
I countries likely to have the hardest time complying (Canada and
Japan) agreed to participate only on the condition that their initial
153
reduction obligations be diluted.

Thus, one can see that the negotiations leading up to the creation of the Kyoto
Protocol ultimately led to a diluted agreement that has done very little to curb
GHG emissions, and will continue to do very little unless significant changes are
made. On the contrary, the Montreal Protocol is a model of efficacy and
effectiveness in that it enjoys near perfect compliance and has done a great deal to
reverse damage to the ozone layer. 154 While the two agreements were created to
address the two most significant environmental threats facing mankind, their
structure, provisions, and respective mechanisms have led to radically different
outcomes.
The goal of any MEA is to encourage both broad participation and deep
cooperation. However, the Kyoto Protocol exhibits mostly broad participation,
along with shallow cooperation and weak compliance. This was a result of the
failed negotiation process that created a settlement for the lowest common
denominator of the parties to the agreement.
However, to encourage deeper cooperation, the Kyoto Protocol needs to
restructure incentives to ensure participation and compliance. Such incentives
include encouraging participation and then discouraging "defection" by
implementing coercive compliance mechanisms that change the cost-benefit
structure of potential defection. Such a treaty would satisfy the following criteria
introduced at the start of this paper:
Individually rational: such individual rationalism comes about when the
cost-benefit assessment is favorable for a nation to gain (or at least not
lose significantly) from treaty participation, either through the costs of
non-participation or direct benefits of participation.
Collectively rational: such rationalism is created when countries are
encouraged to participate and comply with the obligations imposed by the
treaty by creating a system of incentives, constrained by the credibility of
threats or enforcement mechanisms to discourage defection.

153. Barrett, supra note 110, at 295.
154. Indeed the Montreal Protocol has even had a substantial effect on climate change mitigation
because ODSs also contribute to climate change and, hence, their phase-out has provided substantial
climate change mitigation. Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance
Against Abrupt Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 3, 3 (2007).
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Fair: in that it must be perceived by the parties as being legitimate,
55
reinforcing the individual and collective rationality of the agreement. 1
To date, there has been significant legal scholarship on proposed alternatives
to the Kyoto Protocol. However, some of the most common proposals can be listed
as follows:
(1) Broader participation by industrial and developed nations is needed to
address the global commons problem effectively and efficiently. Such
proposals include measures such as "growth targets"'' 56 or creating an
annex for fast-growing developing countries like China, India and
Brazil. 157 Moreover, industrialized countries can also create a similar fund
to that created under the Montreal Protocol in order to lower the cost to
developing countries through direct and in-kind transfers. In this way, the
offer of side payments can be a strategic choice in that the transfer of
money and technology can help ensure that countries that would have lost
by participating, can now reap the benefits of participation.
(2) Include a more comprehensive and fully integrated global emission
trading scheme that would allow businesses instead of governments to
decide for themselves how to spend money on cutting emissions by
setting a variable carbon price. 58 In the alternative to a trading scheme, a
viable carbon taxing system would likely provide the same amount of
flexibility. Any foreseeable agreement on this raging debate would likely
159
include both measures.
(3) Include measures and mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol to prevent
trade leakage. Indeed, it was the trade restrictions, along with the

155. See Barrett, supra note 11, at xii-xiv.
156. Olmstead & Stavins, supra note 99, at 35.
157. See generally Halvorssen, supra note 101, at 248.
158. See Fiona Harvey, UN carbon tax advocacy opens old wounds, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007.
The targets and timetables approach of the Montreal Protocol served to put producers and the relevant
industries on notice that alternative technology was going to have to be developed in light of eventual
cuts, or even complete phase-outs. In this way, the parties gave private business the go-ahead to start
investing in alternatives to CFCs. The resulting incentive then became for producers to be the first to
produce and market CFC alternatives to be sold around the world. Indeed, once substitutes became
available, developing nations were more inclined to use such technology over obsolete CFC technology.
An example of how this process worked is illustrated by Dupont's announcement one year prior to the
Montreal Protocol that it believed it could produce an alternative within five years, but the regulatory
environment had not given them enough incentive to justify the required investment. By late 1988,
Dupont and several other companies had created alternative chemicals. Currently there are a growing
number of companies that view climate change regulation as inevitable, and some are even starting to
propose that the US ratify the Kyoto Protocol to create conditions of investment certainty. In addition,
many companies are now taking the position that the Kyoto Protocol could offer market opportunities
and are pressing the US to reconsider its position. See generally Thomas, supra note 3, at 810 (noting
that the targets and timetables approach adopted by the Montreal Protocol had the additional benefit of
sending signals to CFC producing businesses that investments in alternatives would be profitable).
159. See Editorial, Groundhog Day, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 278, 2007.
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compensation mechanisms to developing countries for incremental costs
that led to a much broader participation among the developing world in
the Montreal Protocol. While such a provision would undoubtedly be
harder to administer under Kyoto, a "hybrid" version could be created to
ensure adequate administration and enforcement. Trade restrictions do
two things: (1) punish those that do not cooperate, and (2) correct for
losses in "competitiveness" of the countries that do participate. Also,
trade restrictions encourage participation, and with higher participation,
the detrimental concerns of competitiveness are lower.
(4) Kyoto should facilitate more technology transfer and joint research
and development (R&D) on a global scale. 160 The Montreal Protocol
encourages the sharing of R&D between participants and even between
In addition, improving the
participants and non-participants. 16
technological capacity of all countries encourages participation because
the cost of participation is lowered if a country is given a leg-up in the
form of cleaner technology before joining an agreement that obliges it to
undertake significant emissions reductions.
(5) Improve compliance and enforcement mechanisms to encourage
compliance from the industrialized countries. Here, it might be proactive
to include the ability to adjust compliance mechanism without party
ratification, as is required for an amendment.
The Parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in Bali between December 3 to
December 14 of 2007 to discuss a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 162 Politics did,
and will continue, to inevitably play a large role in the future of climate change
mitigation. However, to have a significant and lasting impact on GHG emissions,
the successor to the Kyoto Protocol must include adequate incentives to encourage
broad participation, deepen cooperation, and encourage widespread compliance.
The fate of the earth's fragile climate is at stake, and with the Kyoto Protocol's
relatively lackluster impact on mitigating climate change, politics needs to give
way to efficient, efficacious, and lasting solutions that can turn the comer in a
somewhat stalled climate change regime.

160. For a complete discussion of what type of research and development measures should be
incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol, and what role such measures could play, see Barrett, supra note
11, at 391-98.
161. Montreal Protocol, supra note 49, art. 9; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 309-10, 393-94
(noting that an indication of the lack of effectiveness behind Kyoto is that in many of the most proKyoto countries, government funded energy R&D actually decreased). Indeed a reverse relationship
exists too: creating more of an incentive for Kyoto participation through effective compliance will
undoubtedly speed up R&D for alternative technology.
162. See Fiona Harvey and John Aglionby, Bali near deal to save forests, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 12,

